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ited treasuries, and their insurance premiums. The Court, however, disregarded these potential consequences in favor of ensuring that
constitutional rights will be enforced by the courts, even though in doing
so it abandoned strong precedent. The true impact of Monell, however,
will not be realized until the lower federal courts decide what "the full
contours of municipal liability under § 1983 .. .[shall] be." 94
Nancy J Murray

Corporations' Right to Free Speech in Referendum.

Elections: First National Bank v. Bellotti
The Massachusetts general election on November 2, 1976, included a
referendum proposing a constitutional amendment that would authorize a
graduated income tax upon individuals. Several corporations' desired to
spend corporate funds for newspaper advertisements advocating defeat of
the amendment. When Francis X. Bellotti, the Massachusetts Attorney
General, advised them that such expenditures would violate a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporate expenditures to influence referendum
elections, 2 the corporations sought a declaratory judgment from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declaring the statute unconstitutional,
94. Id.at 695.
1. The First National Bank of Boston, New England Merchants National Bank, The
Gillette Company, Digital Equipment Corporation, and Wyman-Gordon Company.
2. MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978) provides:
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank,. . . no business corporation incorporated under the laws of or doing business in the commonwealth
and no officer or agent acting in behalf of any corporation mentioned in this
section, shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute, or promise
to give, pay, expend or contribute, any money or other valuable thing for the
purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination or election of any
person to public office, or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of
any political party, or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property,
business or assets of the corporation. No question submitted to the voters
solely concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of
the corporation.
The statute had been repeatedly amended in attempts to draft a statute that would both
satisfy the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the corporate free speech issue and prevent
corporate expenditures from defeating the individual income tax referendum. See 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1117 (1973). Although the referendum had already been conducted before
the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the case was not rendered moot, as it fell
within the class of controversies "capable of repetition, yet evading review." First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1414, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707, 716 (1978). Because proposed
amendments were seldom enacted more than 18 months before an election, no case challenging the statute could ever be fully litigated before an election result would intervene to
render the case moot.
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both on its face and as it applied to them. The corporations argued that
the statute violated freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment
as applied to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, denied the corporations equal protection of the laws, and violated
similar provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution.3 The Massachusetts
court decided that a corporation had freedom of speech protection only
when the referendum issue materially affected its business, property, or
assets, on the grounds that a corporation's right to protected speech arises
only from its property interests under the fourteenth amendment. 4 Since
the Massachusetts legislature had determined that no referendum question
solely concerning the taxation of individuals could materially affect a corporation's property interest, the Massachusetts court refused to substitute
its judgment for the legislature's, and upheld the constitutionality of the
challenged statute. Held, reserved: The Massachusetts statute prohibiting
corporate expenditures to influence referendum elections is an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech under the first and fourteenth amendments. First NationalBank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707
(1978).
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE RIGHTS VERSUS RESTRICTIONS ON
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The Supreme Court's invalidation of the Massachusetts law prohibiting
corporate expenditures should come as no surprise. It is the natural result
of an inevitable collision of two independent lines of legal development
involving corporations. For the past century a series of Supreme Court
decisions has gradually expanded the scope of protected corporate liberties
under the fourteenth amendment. During the same period, a series of statutes enacted both by Congress and the states had increasingly restricted
the use of corporate funds to influence elections. The stage was set for a
conflict between the restrictive statutes and the corporate claims to constitutionally protected liberty when the Supreme Court decided in Buckley v.
Valeo6 that individuals' political expenditures and contributions are protected speech under the first amendment.
A.

CorporateRights Under the Fourteenth Amendment

While a corporation is a legal creation, not an individual, the United
States Supreme Court has progressively extended fourteenth amendment
protection to corporations over the past century. Decisions so holding
3. MASS. CONST. arts. X, XI, XVI.
4. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney General, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Mass. 1977).
5. Id. at 1271. To avoid appellants' claims that the section created an "irrebuttable
evidentiary presumption," the court interpreted expenditures on the personal tax issue as a
separate per se crime requiring proof of each element. Id. at 1276. Yet the court also held
that the appellants could have invalidated the law by showing that the individual income tax
would materially affect their business or property (the absence of "material effect" was itself
not an element of the per se crime). Id. at 1271.
6. 424 U.S. I (1976).
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have focused either upon the constitutionally protected rights the corporation possesses as an entity, or upon certain constitutionally protected expressive activities, whether sponsored by a corporation or an individual.
Among the earliest decisions defining a corporation's rights as an entity
protected under the fourteenth amendment is a recognition that corporations qualify as "persons" whose corporate property rights7 are protected
under the due process clause, which provides: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
... ,,sA definition of the extent of other corporate rights under the fourteenth amendment, however, has been more difficult. Rights possessed by
individuals do not necessarily belong to corporations. Despite dicta in
early Supreme Court decisions suggesting that a corporation may not
claim fourteenth amendment protection under the "liberty" clause,9 the
Court's definition of corporate rights has not distinguished rights arising
from the property clause from rights arising from the liberty clause.
Rather, in identifying rights available to corporations, the Court has considered whether the nature and evolution of the claimed right made it appropriate for corporations.' The basic guarantees of natural justice, such
as a right to petition the government," a right against unreasonable search3
and seizure,' 2 and protection against being placed in double jeopardy,'
belong to corporations under the fourteenth amendment. On the other
hand, the personal nature of such rights as the free exercise of religion and
the right to vote make them clearly inappropriate to business corporations. 4 Because there is no human personality to be invaded, the constitu7. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
9. In a retreat from the dominant "substantive due process" review of economic regulation, established in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court had held in a
series of decisions that liberty, particularly liberty of contract, belonged solely to "natural
persons," when it denied corporations' claims to fourteenth amendment liberty protection
against state economic regulations. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925);
Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co.
v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). In Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), the only such case
involving the first amendment, the Court had applied this reasoning to deny standing to the
ACLU, a corporation. Even so, the individual union member plaintiffs were successful in
their first amendment challenge to a restrictive Jersey City ordinance. Although the denial
of protection to the liberty of the corporation made no practical difference to the case's
outcome, Hague v. CIO is sometimes cited for its dictum that the fourteenth amendment due
process clause limits its protection of corporations to their "property rights."
10. Comment, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech and the Corporation, 4 VILL. L.
REV. 377, 377-79 (1959).
11. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-38
(1961) (first amendment); cf.California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508, 510-12 (1972) (corporate right to petition limited by antitrust laws).
12. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353-55 (1977) (fourth amendment).
13. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (fifth amendment).
14. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XV. But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (no denial of equal protection when water district restricted voting rights to landowners, including corporations, and denied them to nonlandowning resident individuals). See also SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535
(lst Cir. 1976) (federal securities laws applied to religious corporation despite a freedom of
religion claim under the first amendment).
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tional protections against self-incrimination" or invasion of privacy, 6
have likewise been denied to corporations.
By contrast, in decisions involving the protected status of a corporation's
expressive activities, the Court has not considered the corporation as an
entity, but has focused on whether the expression itself should be protected
under the freedom of the press and freedom of speech guarantees of the
first amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. In giving protection to a wide variety of expressions 7 under the
freedom of the press guarantee,' 8 the Court has not distinguished between
corporate and individual sponsors in defining the scope of protection. Protection for corporate expressions under the free speech guarantee, however, has not been so extensive. Corporate expressive activities have been
protected as free speech in three contexts. The speech of corporate employers in a National Labor Relations Board dispute has first amendment
protection,' 9 and a nonbusiness corporation's speech activity in challenging illegal discrimination on behalf of its members is protected as a liberty
under the fourteenth amendment.2 ° Most important, however, is the
15. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-86 (1911);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906) (fifth amendment).
16. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-67 (1974); United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right of privacy for married couple, derived from first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments, incorporated in the fourteenth).
17. Protected corporate "publications" take many forms:
(1) Newspapers. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
(2) Books. Compare Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1957) (upholding New York obscenity law), with Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151-55 (1959)
(invalidating California statute punishing possession of obscene book).
(3) Films. Compare Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684, 688 (1959), andJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-02 (1952) (film
licensing invalid under first amendment), with Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 58-71 (1976), and Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961) (film
licensing upheld).
(4) Radio and television broadcasts. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975); but note the limits the fairness doctrine imposes on broadcasters in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
(5) Public entertainment featuring nude performers. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
18. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). It is well established that
both freedom of speech and freedom of the press as protected under the first amendment are
liberty, not property, rights "incorporated" by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Contra,
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-08 (1957) (Harlan J., dissenting in part); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287-95 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
19. NLRB v.Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969); iee Comment, supra note
10, at 386-87; Comment, Employer Freedom ofSpeech in Labor Relations, 14 FORDHAM L.
REV. 59 (1945); Annot., 146 A.L.R. 1024 (1943).
•20. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
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Court's recognition of the protected status of commercial speech in Vir21
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.
This case emphasizes that the right to freedom of speech preserves not only
the expressive rights of the speaker but also protects society's right to receive "a free flow of commercial information. 2 Thus, even if a speaker's
self-expressive interests in the expression are not sufficient to give it protected status, as, for example, the pharmacist's interest in communicating
his prescription prices, the advertisement may nevertheless constitute protected speech because of the public's interest in receiving the information.
The protected status of corporate advertisements was not expressly considered by the Court in Virginia Pharmacy. By analogy, however, even
though it is doubtful whether a corporation may claim any right to selfexpression, advertisements sponsored by a corporation should have the
same protection as those made by an individual under the "right to receive" rationale when they offer valuable information to the public.2 3 In
summary, although other corporate claims to protection under the fourteenth amendment may be evaluated by whether such a right is appropriate to the corporate entity, a corporation's right to free expression, whether
by speech or press, depends upon the protected interests inherent in the
communication itself.
B.

Restrictions upon CorporateParticpationin the PoliticalProcess

Although corporate press and some corporate speech activities have
been protected under the first and fourteenth amendments, whether political expressions sponsored by corporations were also protected had been
previously undecided by the Court. To determine the status of corporate
political speech, consideration must be given to three competing interests:
one is the first amendment protection for political speech in general; another is the governmental responsibility for safeguarding the electoral
process from corruption; and the third is the inseparable connection between expenditures of money and any political expression by a corporation.
Political speech has been given the highest degree of first amendment
protection .2' The basic assumption of the constitutional free speech guarantee is that unfettered discussion will allow truth to prevail through the
control provided by the free exercise of the listener's reason, rather than by
state regulation. 25 The first amendment, as applied to the states through
the fourteenth, safeguards a free "marketplace of ideas" as a foundation
21. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
22. Id. at 763-65.

23. Cf.Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (corporation's real estate for sale signs protected as commercial speech).
24. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); see Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is
an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255-66.
25. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Whitney v. Califorconcurring).
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,

1364

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

for self-government. 26 Any governmental restrictions of the content of political speech are thus inherently suspect. 27
The state, however, has a strong competing interest in protecting the
electoral process from corruption,2 8 which complicates the question of
whether corporate political speech is protected. When the Supreme Court
was first recognizing corporate rights under the fourteenth amendment,
Congress and the states were also enacting the first laws prohibiting the use
of corporate funds to influence elections, 29 initially by prohibiting corporate contributions to candidates. Variations and expanded versions of
such laws still exist in most state and federal election codes. Designed to
protect the electoral process from corruption, such statutes generally have
a common focus: to prevent money from replacing votes as the medium of
exchange of self-government.3" To discourage the interference that large
sums of money in corporate and union treasuries may have with the electoral process, various federal and state statutes prohibit corporate and
union contributions to candidates, 3' deny corporations tax deductions3 2 or
26. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
27. City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 17576 (1976); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
28. The electoral process should be distinguished from the political process. The electoral process involves the citizen's exercise of his right to vote; its premise is that all voters'
expressions are to be equal at the ballot box. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 347-54 (1977); Comment,
Campaign Finance Acts-An Attempted Balance Between Public Interests and Individual
Freedoms, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 345, 347-51 (1976). Once elected, governing representatives'
primary duty is to represent those voters who elected them, not merely the donors whose
money financed the campaign. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). In order to
preserve this trust between a voter and his elected representative, the state and federal governments may have a constitutional duty to regulate elections and prohibit corruption. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 & art. IV, § 4. In a protected speech analysis, this state interest may
assume a constitutional dimension equivalent to first amendment interests. As a further
distinction, in the electoral process only citizens have a right to participate as voters; corporations have no such right. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
29. Corporations were first barred from federal election contributions in 1907, to end
the corrupting effect of "political debts." Act of Jan. 26, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat.
864. Re-enacted in 1925 as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, the law extended its criminal
penalties to contribution recipients as well. Pub. L. No. 68-506, ch. 368, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070
(1925) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976)).
30. Hearings before House Comm. on Elections, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1894) (statement of Elihu Root), quoted in United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957).
31. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976); see United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973) and United States v. United States Brewers Ass'n, 239 F. 163
(W.D. Pa. 1916) (in both cases statute's constitutionality upheld). Similar contribution restrictions apply to public utility holding companies. 15 U.S.C. § 79(h) (1976). See also Egan
v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943). For a survey of
state statutes limiting corporate contributions, see H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS:
MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 173-77 (1976); Garrett, Corporate Contributions for PoliticalPurposes, 14 Bus. LAW. 365, 368-69 (1959); King, Corporate Political
Spending andthe FirstAmendment, 23 U. PIrr. L. REV. 847 (1962); Annot., 125 A.L.R. 1029
(1940). See, e.g., TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 14.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79); O'Connor,
Campaign Financingin Texas, 40 TEX. B.J. 1029, 1031-32 (1977).
32. I.R.C. § 162(e). Compare Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)
(upholding IRS regulation denying tax deduction for corporate expenditure to influence initiative election), with Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (invalidatng law condi-
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exemptions 33 for political expenses, and require detailed financial reporting34 to facilitate the discovery of possible improper payments.
Another method of controlling this potential interference of money is
not only to forbid contributions but also to prohibit any political
expenditure by a corporation or union. Political expenditures by corporations have been prohibited in both federal 35 and state 36 elections. Such
laws, however, may totally silence corporations, since a corporation lacks a
natural voice and may therefore effectively communicate its political views
37
only through activities involving some expenditure of corporate funds.
Thus, a determination of whether corporate political expenditures are constitutionally protected is an essential aspect of a determination of the constitutional status of corporate political speech in general. Although the
constitutional validity of the federal statute prohibiting corporate or union
expenditures has been repeatedly challenged, the Court has avoided deciding this question by narrowly construing the statute to exclude from prohibition such expenditures as in-house political publications and use of
38
funds created by voluntary member or shareholder contributions.
C

Money as Speech

The potential conflict between the series of Court decisions identifying
protected corporate expressions and the state and federal statutes restricting corporate political expenditures was brought sharply into focus by the
Supreme Court in 1976. In Buckley v. Valeo the Court held that both potioning veteran's tax exemption upon loyalty oath). See Lambert, Corporate Political
Spending and Campaign Finance,40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1066-74 (1965).
33. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (h).

34. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-439 (1976) (election reporting); 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1976) (lobbying reporting); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-82 (1976) (contribution and expenditure
disclosures upheld); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1954) (Federal Lobbying
Act's disclosure requirements upheld); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544-45
(1934) (record requirement for interstate political committee upheld). But see Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (Texas statute requiring registration to solicit union memberships invalid). See generally H. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 170-76.
35. A prohibition of corporate and union expenditures in federal candidate elections
was first adopted in 1947. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
§ 304, 61 Stat. 136 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976)). The legislative history of the
statute indicates that the congressional purpose was to end the "undue influence" exerted by
labor union expenditures in past elections. See S. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-24
(1945); H.R. REP. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-51 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2093, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-12 (1945). For a summary of the legislative history, see United States v.
UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 579-84 (1957).
36. See, e.g., MAss. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978), set out in note 2
supra.
37. Laws prohibiting corporate expenditures to influence elections not only forbid direct political expenditures of corporate funds, such as advertising, leaflets, or signs, but also
usually penalize such "in kind" diversion of corporate resources as use of manpower, office
space, supplies, or property to influence an election.
38. Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United States v. CIO,
335 U.S. 106 (1948). In United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the Court held that
the alleged funding of political broadcasts, if proved, might constitute violations of the statute, but it remanded the case for a trial to develop the facts, and thus avoided deciding the
statute's constitutionality. On remand, however, the defendants were acquitted by a jury
after a trial on the merits. See Lambert, supra note 32, at 1047 n.69.
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litical contributions and independent political expenditures made by indi39
viduals are forms of expression protected under the first amendment.
The Court upheld the $1,000 annual ceiling on individual contributions to
a candidate set by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974,40 but invalidated any limitations upon independent expenditures in
general made by either individuals or candidates.4"
In deciding that these uses of money were forms of expression to be
protected as free speech, the Court did not expressly rule whether the political payments constituted either "pure speech," symbolic conduct with a
protected communicative element, or simply mere conduct. The level of
judicial scrutiny to be applied to sustain a government restriction upon
such speech or conduct depends on how the behavior is categorized. An
infringement of pure speech can be upheld only when the most stringent
strict scrutiny test is satisfied.42 By contrast, state regulations of conduct
are sustained if they meet the minimal test of a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.4 3 When nonverbal conduct has a communicative element, however, it may be considered "symbolic speech" that is protected
by the first amendment.4n To determine whether a state regulation of such
conduct with a communicative element can be sustained, the four-part test
established in United States v. O'Brien must be satisfied:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.4 5
The Buckley Court avoided an express characterization of the contested
political expenditures as either pure speech or as conduct with a communicative element by its determination that even if political gifts and expenditures were considered arguendo to be conduct, the statutory pending limits
would fail the third part of the less stringent O'Brien test. Because the
39. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
40. Id. at 24-38. The Federal Election Campaign Act re-enacted with some changes the
former Federal Corrupt Practices Act prohibitions of corporate and union contributions and
expenditures; it is codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976). This section was not challenged by the
Buckley plaintiffs.
41. 424 U.S. at 39-51. For a discussion of Buckley v. Valeo, see Leventhal, Courts and
Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 356-75 (1977), and Wright, Politicsand the Constitution.: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1001-21 (1976).

42. The "strict scrutiny" test places the burden upon the state to demonstrate that the
state has a "compelling interest" in its regulation of speech and that the statute is narrowly

drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960).
43.

See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

44. First amendment protection is given to conduct when it is an inextricable part of an
expressive or associational activity. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (display of

American flag painted with peace symbol); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (distribution of birth control device); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88

(1940) (peaceful picketing); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (display of red
flag).
45. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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purpose of the statute's expenditure prohibition was to limit the amount of
money spent in political campaigns; and thereby the number of political
messages such money would finance, the statute was directed precisely at
the "suppression of free expression. 46 With this reasoning the Court decided that both political expenditures and contributions constituted protected speech under the first amendment.4 7
Although both contributions and expenditures were classified as protected expressions by the introductory rationale of the per curiam opinion,
the opinion also revealed the differing first amendment interests present in
the two types of political payments. The Court's detailed discussion of
contributions indicated that the primary first amendment interest infringed
by the contribution ceilings was the individual's right to freedom of political association, with passing notice of the free speech element of contributions. These contribution limitations were upheld, however, because the
infringement of associational rights was an unavoidable result of a narrowly drawn means of accomplishing the compelling state interest of
preventing actual or apparent electoral corruption.4 8
In contrast to the valid contribution ceilings, the individual expenditure
ceilings were invalid "limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression," 49 imposing "more severe restrictions on protected freedoms." 5 Such a severe infringement of free'speech was justified neither
by the government interest in preventing actual or apparent electoral corruption nor by a desire to equalize "the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections."'-' Any government attempt
to equalize voices in the political process by restricting the more powerful
was held inconsistent with the first amendment's guarantee of "unfettered
interchange of [political] ideas."52
By thus establishing that political expenditures by individuals are protected speech under the first amendment, Buckley v.Valeo provided the
basis for a first amendment challenge to statutory prohibitions of political
expenditures by corporations. The decision established that political expenditures are to be analyzed as speech rather than conduct, applied a
strict scrutiny analysis to statutory restrictions on expenditures, and determined that preventing the undue influence of those with greater wealth or
power did not constitute a valid state interest that would justify first
amendment infringement.
46. 424 U.S. at 17. But see Wright, supra note 41, at 1005-10.
47. 424 U.S. at 14-23. The Court did not further distinguish whether the expenditure
and contribution ceilings operated as direct or indirect infringements upon speech and applied the two-part exacting scrutiny test to both, which requires a showing by the government of a "sufficiently important interest" and use of "means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment." 424 U.S. at 25, 44-48.
48. 424 U.S. at 29-30.
49. Id. at 44-45.
50. Id. at 23.
51. Id. at 48.
52. Id. at 49. The Court implicitly rejected as a valid governmental interest the prevention of "undue influence" by particular individuals or groups, the rationale used in 1947 to

justify the prohibition of corporate political expenditures. See note 35 supra.
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK V. BELLOTTI

The questions presented to the Court in First National Bank v. Bellotti
were not only whether corporations have a constitutional right to engage
in political speech, but also whether a state may limit corporate political
expression to issues "materially affecting" the corporation's business. The
Massachusetts court had framed the issue as whether and to what extent
corporations have first amendment rights. Justice Powell, however, joined
by four other Justices, 53 defined the issue as whether the statute "abridges
expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." 54 This focus
upon the expression instead of the speaker relieved the Court of the difficult task of defining the extent of the corporation's constitutional rights
and allowed it to proceed with a traditional first amendment analysis of
the contested statute and its effect upon the proposed advertisement. This
approach was consistent with prior decisions interpreting the protected sta55
tus of corporate expressions under the first and fourteenth amendments.
The analysis was thereby limited first to an examination of whether the
proposed expenditure was protected speech, and next to an identification
of the nature of the state abridgement. Finally, as the test of "exacting
scrutiny" was invoked, the Court considered whether the asserted state interests were compelling, and, if so, whether the statutory restriction was
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of free speech.56
Relying on Buckley v. Valeo, 57 Justice Powell assumed without discussion that the proposed political expenditures were speech, leaving only the
question of whether the speech was protected. The content of the proposed advertisment opposing the tax issue fell clearly within the zone of
protection afforded by the first amendment, because discussion of governmental affairs lies "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection,"5 8
and also because the public has a protected interest in receiving diverse
information about political issues.59
Justice Powell rejected the argument that in spite of the protected nature
of the expression's content, the corporate identity of the advertisement's
sponsor could nevertheless deprive it of free speech protection. The Massachusetts court had limited a corporation's free speech protection to those
issues "materially affecting" its business, property, or assets, on the
grounds that free speech rights under the fourteenth amendment could be
53. Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens; Chief Justice Burger submitted a separate

concurring opinion.
54. 98 S. Ct. at 1415, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 717.
55. See notes 17-23 supra.
56. See notes 42 & 47 supra.
57. "It is too late to suggest 'that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting
scrutiny required by the First Amendment.'" 98 S. Ct. at 1421, n.23, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 724
n.23.
58. Id. at 1415-16, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 717-18.
59. The first amendment protects not only the individual's right to self-expression but
also society's interest in a free flow of information. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-15 (1966); text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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derived only from a corporation's property interests. Justice Powell refuted the view of the Massachusetts court by pointing out that freedom of
the press and freedom of speech as applied to corporate expressions in past
decisions 60 clearly focused on "liberty" rights, not "property" rights. 6' As
further support to the view that the corporate identity of the advertisement's sponsor should not deprive it of protected status, Justice Powell
cited the unquestioned protected status afforded to the political expressions
of news media corporations, such as newspapers. Justice Powell could
identify no rational basis for denying similar protected status to other business corporations. 62 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger reinforced this argument by examining the historical origins of the first
amendment; he could find no indication that the framers of the amendment intended persons or organizations engaged in "institutional press"
activities to have greater protection than others.63
Justice Powell found that the Massachusetts statute would abridge this
protected speech by imposing criminal penalties upon a corporation for
spending its funds to influence referendum voters.' By conditioning the
penalties both upon the corporate identity of the speaker and upon the
content of the expression, the statute improperly required a speaker to justify 65its speech by showing sufficient property interests in the election issue.
Because the statute abridged protected speech, Justice Powell invoked
strict scrutiny, under which the statute could survive only upon a showing
by the state of a "subordinating interest which is compelling. '66 Massachusetts contended that its statute was designed to sustain the active participation of the individual citizen in the electoral process by preventing
actual or apparent electoral corruption and by restricting the potential un60. See notes 17-23 supra.
61. 98 S. Ct. at 1417-20, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 719-22. Even though the previous free speech
and free press decisions involving corporations would have coincidentally satisfied Massachusetts' "materially affecting" test, Justice Powell refused to explain those decisions by imposing such a latter-day theory, especially since those decisions did not mention the
corporation's property rights as a basis of decision.
62. A newspaper expends corporate funds internally when it prints an editorial advocating passage of a referendum. A nonmedia corporation, however, must either purchase printing or broadcast equipment, or engage an independent contractor to communicate its views
to the public. Id. at 1418-19 & nn.17 & 18, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 720-21 & nn.17 & 18.
63. "[T]he First Amendment does not 'belong' to any definable category of persons or
entities: it belongs to all who exercise its freedoms." Id. at 1429, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 734. Chief
Justice Burger's concurring opinion also emphasized that no distinction had been identified
to justify differentiating media from nonmedia corporations under the Massachusetts statute
[the statute had been judicially construed to exclude editorial endorsements by newspaper
corporations from its penalties]. Chief Justice Burger argued that when news sources were
concentrated under central corporate ownership, this central editorial source might pose
greater risks of electoral corruption than expenditures by nonmedia corporations, such as
the advertisement at issue. Moreover, the Chief Justice also found no basis for distinguishing media from nonmedia corporations in respect to the state interest in protecting the rights
of minority shareholders. Id. at 1426-27, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 730-31.
64. Id. at 1420, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 723.
65. Id.
66. 98 S. Ct. at 1421, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 724; see note 42 supra.
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due influence of corporations. Additionally, the state asserted an interest
in protecting the minority shareholders of the corporation from the diversion of their investment to support political issues they opposed.6 7
The Court first rejected the state's argument that prohibition of expenditures would lessen corruption: in a referendum involving no candidates,
the danger of corruption is not present.68 Rejecting the validity of the
state's asserted interest in reducing the "undue influence" of corporations,
Justice Powell echoed Buckley v. Valeo: "[T]he fact that advocacy may
persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it ..
."69 The risk
of entrusting the responsibility of evaluating ideas to the people had been
implicitly recognized and undertaken by framers of the first amendment.
As had been implied by Buckley, the majority here explicitly rejected the
"prevention of undue influence" as a permissible state interest under the
first amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth.7 °
Finally, Justice Powell acknowledged that protection of minority shareholders is a valid state interest, but he did not determine whether the interest was compelling. Assuming arguendo that it was compelling, Justice
Powell found that the statute was not narrowly drawn to accomplish the
purpose of shareholder protection without unnecessary infringement of
protected speech. 7 ' The statute was not sufficiently narrow, because it was
both under- and over-inclusive. It was under-inclusive in that it prohibited
neither political expenditures by a corporation for lobbying or for nonelection public issues nor political expenditures by business organizations
other than corporations, such as business trusts or labor unions, which
might also have disagreeing minority members. It was over-inclusive by
prohibiting corporate
political speech even when shareholders gave unani72
mous approval.
Having found no compelling state interest to justify the abridgement of
protected speech, the majority held that the statute was unconstitutional.
The decision was carefully confined to invalidate only the restriction upon
corporate expenditures to influence referendum elections. Justice Powell
67. 98 S. Ct. at 1422, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 727-28.
68. In a referendum voters act as their own legislators in adopting or rejecting laws;
there are no candidates to be corrupted by contributions.
69. 98 S. Ct. at 1423, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 727.
70. Id. at 1424, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 728.
71. Justice Powell found "'no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking." Id. at
1426, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 730.
72. Id. at 1424-26, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 728-29. The Court found irrelevant to the protection
of minority shareholders two past decisions in which the Court had held that the first
amendment protected dissenting members of closed shop unions, created under state or federal law, from having their compulsory union dues used to support political causes they
disapproved. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). Those decisions had required rebates to those
dissenters of the proportion of their dues used for political purposes. By contrast, corporate

shareholders had been denied an implied federal cause of action for illegal diversions of
corporate funds to political causes. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Bellotti the Court
emphasized the absence of state action in the corporate setting and the voluntary, transferrable nature of an investment as important distinctions.
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strongly implied that a different balancing of interests would be required
upon corporate political expenditures in candito review the restrictions
73
elections.
date
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, began his dissent by agreeing with the majority that corporate political expenditures
were protected under the first and fourteenth amendments. He would nevertheless have upheld the Massachusetts statute because he identified a
narrower scope of first amendment protection for corporations 74 and
found that the corporate free speech rights here were no greater than the
first amendment values inherent in the interests asserted by Massachusetts.
The challenged statute protected first amendment interests of voters by
preventing corporations from dominating the free marketplace of ideas
with wealth amassed under "special advantages extended by the State" to
the corporate form. 75 The statute further protected the freedom of speech
of minority shareholders by preventing diversion of their investment to
political causes they disapproved.7 6 Because these state interests
represented first amendment values at least as significant as those
presented by the corporations, Justice White argued that the statute and
the compelling state interests that it served should survive exacting scrutiny and criticized the majority for substituting its judgment for that of the
Massachusetts legislature in determining the most effective method of safeguarding these first amendment interests.
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the grounds that as a creature of the
state, a corporation was entitled to claim only those rights expressly
granted by its charter and those "incidental to its very existence." Liberty
to engage in political speech about matters not "materially affecting" the
corporation's business, property, or assets was not incidental to its existence. Therefore, its right to make political expenditures was not protected
by the fourteenth amendment.7 7
Essentially, First National Bank v. Bellotti establishes that state laws
73. 98 S. Ct. at 1422 n.26, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 725 n.26.
74. Business corporations are unable to assert the primary interest protected by the first
amendment: "communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization and self-fulfillment." Id. at 1431, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 735-36.
75. Such advantages include limited liability, perpetual life, and accumulation of assets.
Id. at 1433, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 738-39.
76. Id. at 1434-35, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 740-41. Justice White likened the dissenting shareholder to the dissenting members of state-created closed shop unions. See note 72 supra.
He acknowledged the absence of state action in the corporate setting but gave little note to
the voluntary and liquid nature of an investment when compared to a job.
77. "'A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.'" 98 S. Ct. at 1440, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 747-48 (quoting Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)). Justice Rehnquist based his reasoning on his view that
the first amendment has limited application to the states. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 503-08 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
287-95 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). His argument implied that a corporation's claim to
freedom of the press depends upon the grant of a state charter for that purpose. Such a
limited theory of a corporation's right to freedom of the press suggests a licensing system,
which the Court has long disapproved. See Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion, 98 S.
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prohibiting corporate expenditures to influence referendum elections may
withstand first amendment challenge only if they are narrowly drawn and
designed to protect minority shareholders. The Court left unanswered the
broader question of whether either corporate contributions or expenditures
in candidate elections are protected speech. The Bellotti opinion implies
that statutes prohibiting corporate political contributions to candidates will
probably survive the Court's exacting scrutiny analysis for two reasons.
First, the state's interest in preventing the corruption inherent in large contributions already qualifies as a compelling interest.7 8 Secondly, corporations have no claim to the freedom of political association, identified in
Buckley as the primary first amendment interest present in contributions
to candidates. By contrast, statutes prohibiting independent corporate expenditures for communications advocating the election or defeat of a particular candidate may not survive exacting scrutiny as applied in Buckley
and Bellotti. A state's interest in preventing the undue influence of corporations, which provided the initial motivation behind statutes prohibiting
corporate political expenditures, will no longer serve as a valid, much less
a compelling, state interest when the statute infringes protected speech.
Furthermore, the public's first amendment interest in receiving a "free flow
of information" is equally present in an independent corporate expenditure for candidate advertisements as in those about a referendum issue.
Finally, even should a state assert a sufficiently compelling interest, the
Court will still be confronted with the difficult task of deciding whether
there is a rational basis to deny free speech protection to candidate advertisements by nonmedia corporations in light of the undisputed protected
status accorded the editorial endorsements of candidates by news media
corporations such as newspapers.7 9
III.

CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that individual political expenditures were protected speech, a challenge to laws prohibiting
such expenditures by corporations was inevitable. Corporate rights to
freedom of the press and freedom of speech in nonpolitical contexts had
been well established by the Court. Although the decision was confined to
invalidating a statute prohibiting expenditures made to influence a referendum election, First NationalBank v. Bellotti establishes that free speech
protection under the fourteenth amendment extends to corporate expenditures made in a political context as well. In an analysis focusing upon the
protected status of the expression instead of the corporate identity of the
speaker, Justice Powell's reasoning included three major principles: first,
the public has a protected right, derived from the first and fourteenth
Ct. at 1429, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 733-34; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-51
(1936).
78. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).

